MDMP and Military Strategy Essay

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Military Decision Making Process Exam (MDMP)

Movement Estimate of the Operations

Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs)

Commander's Judgment

COA Analysis, Comparison & Recommendation

Movement Estimate of the Operations

The POW Camp

The planning for the liberation of American and Allied prisoners held in a compound at Pangatian is to be done at central Luzon. The camp was five miles east of Cabanatuan.

The primary hindrance to the plan would be the rapid and frequent movement of the Japanese troops on the highway in front of the camp where the PoWs were held. The compound, in addition to being behind enemy lines was also the mainstay of Japanese troop movements. The Japanese retreating troops moved at night and rested during the day and the POW camp is one such resting place. The roads in the Pangatian area are regularly used by Japanese tanks. Dense troop concentrations are also reported in the Cabanatuan City and Cabu.

The camp is 600 by 800 yards and has 3 layered fencing on three sides with outpost at the main gate and in the rear side of the camp. The main gate is locked with a concealed sentry in guard.

Given the chances of being spotted by the Japanese, the march would be conducted primarily in the dark especially just before entering the enemy territory. The actual attack would also be done after sunset.

There was not much time at hand as the Japanese had already moved some of the POWs form the camp they were held in and if the rest of the POWs were to be saved swift and quick movement of the forces was necessary. It is estimated that at the pace the Japanese forces are retreating the area, the rangers should not have more than a week to plan and execute the rescue operations.

Aids in Planning

The planning is to be done on the basis of aerial photographs. Air reconnaissance would reach the 6th army from the Air Corps who would then send the intelligence to a forward base at Guimba from where the intelligence is to be transferred to the Rangers over SCR 694 radio.

Ground surveillance of the objective would be done by the Alamo Scouts who would leave the Rangers' base camp at Calasiao on the afternoon of 27 January to go to a guerrilla headquarters at Guimba. From there they would be escorted and supported by the guerrilla guides to Plater three miles north of the POW camp. The objectives of the surveillance would be to know the number of Japanese troops, the guards their routines. The information would be given to the rangers after they reached the spot.

Rangers Movement

Base Camp to Lobong

It is estimated that at a comfortable place starting from the base camp, it would take two days for the Rangers to reach the objective -- the POW camp.

The Rangers start marching for Guimba, about seventy-five miles east of base camp, on 28 January where they would be joined by an eighty-man guerrilla force and native guides. At Balincarin, about five miles northeast of the objective, the Rangers would Alamo Scouts and a second eighty-man guerrilla force on January 29.

If the march begins at 0500 on 28 January in the truck convoy and it would reach Guimba at around 1400 hrs from where native guides could take them south east to a guerrilla camp near Lobong about five miles away and should reach the place by later afternoon.

Lobong to Balincarin

At the same pace of movement, the Rangers would be able to cross in to the enemy territory about a mile south of Baloc after nightfall, after walking through open grasslands and rice paddies. At around midnight, the team would cross the Talavera river at around 0000 hrs and reach and cross Rizal Highway at around 0400 hrs the next day -- 29 January. In a couple of hours they would reach Balincarin.

The route, as selected and advised by locals and the guerrillas, the soldiers should rest for the day and start march towards Platero about 2.5 miles south after 1600 hrs. The pace of the march, so far help by the Rangers should take them to Platero at dusk.

The team is again advised to rest and wait for the final assault here.

On January 30, at around 1700 hours, the team should leave Platero for the final assault.

The team should reach a clear spot about a mile away from the objective camp in about an hour moving cautiously.

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It would be dark by then and the element of surprise would help the Rangers to achieve their objective.

Return Path

The safe return of the POWs would ensure the complete success of the mission and hence the return journey is as much of importance and the onward march.

The Rangers and the POWs would first stop in Platero for reorganization and some food. The rescued POWs would have to walk to Balincarin the same night as soon as possible.

The next stop for the column would be at Matoas Na Kahey and they should reach there by around 0200 hrs on 31 January given the expected slow pace of the POWs.

It is advised that the most dangerous leg of the return journey would be after crossing Matoas Na Kahey as the column would be required to cross the Rizal highway and that too the cross over entailed a one mile long walk along the highway. At the pace expected from the weakened ex-POWs, it should take about an hour to traverse the stretch of the highway. It is expected that the column would reach Sibul at around 0800 on 31 January. The column should feel safe when it reaches here and given sufficient contact with the base camp can also expect evacuation trucks and ambulances at this spot.

Role of Locals & Guerrillas

On March to the POW Camp

The locals and the guerrillas would help the Rangers every step of their way. The Alamo Scouts would be helped by local guides and guerrillas would help in surveillance of the camp.

The route would be selected by locals to ensure maximum safety of the Rangers and availability of food and water on both journeys.

The guerrillas under Prince and Pajota will arrange all-around security, a carabao-cart train for 200 liberated POWs and food for 650 men along the return route.

The civilians of on the route, on instructions of the guerilla will pen all the chicken and muzzle all the dogs so that there is no sound while the rangers march along.

The Rangers would be provided with food, water and shelter by the locals at Platero.

The guerrillas will also help the mission by setting up road blocks on the highway on both sides of the POW camp to stop Japanese troops entering the area before and during the attack

Return Journey with POWs

The locals will arrange for carabao carts for the POWs on the south bank of the Pampanga River. The returning column will be provided food and water by locals at Platero and the guerrilla doctor would treat the sick and wounded.

At Bahncarin, the returning column will get more food and water from local people and there is a possibility of getting more carabao carts. Similarly it is expected that food and water would be given by the local civilians at Matoas Na Kahey and additional carabao carts.

The Problem

METT-TC analysis.

Mission.

The mission is to free POWs comprising of American soldiers and soldiers form allied forces taken hostage by Japanese forces and kept in a camp that is reportedly heavily guarded.

The commander's intent is to utilize the resources available and freeing the POWs a=with as little damage to the rescuing forces as possible.

The intent includes the following tasks:

Surveillance, discrete marching, striking with surprise, neutralizing the enemy, freeing the POWs and returning safely with them to the base camp.

Implied tasks are securing help from the Filipino guerrillas and the locals on the way and back.

Enemy:

The enemy includes the 75 Japanese army men posted and guarding the camp as well as the retreating Japanese forces from the area that are regularly using the highway in front of the camp. The heavy Japanese presence in the two towns of Cabu and Cababatuan City and the movement of new Japanese force of approximately a division strength heading towards Bongabon from the Southwest are the problems.

Another problem is that in case the Japanese is able to alert the troops placed at these two towns, then they can reach the camp very quickly using the highway and the tanks that the enemy possess can cause heavy damage to the Rangers.

Terrain and weather.

One of the major problems for the Rangers is that the stretch of land about mile away from the target is barren and there is no way that the troops can march and not be.....

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